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Abstract :
The first striking feature is that ownership of the average UK company is diffuse: a coalition of at least
eight shareholders is required to reach an absolute majority of voting rights. Even though the average firm has
a dispersed ownership, the reader should bear in mind that there are about ten per cent of firms where the
founder or his heirs are holding more than 30 per cent. The ownership structure is also shaped by regulation;
the mandatory takeover threshold of 30%, for example, has an important impact on the ownership structure. In
about 4% of sample companies, corporate shareholders hold just under 30 per cent of the shares. Second,
institutional investors are the most important category of shareholders. However, they tend to follow passive
strategies and often do not exercise the votes attached to their shares. Third, the passive stance adopted by
institutions increases the already significant power of directors, who are the second most important category of
shareholders. Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (1998) show that when directors own substantial shareholdings,
they use their voting power to entrench their positions and they can impede monitoring actions taken by other
shareholders to restructure the board, even in the wake of poor corporate performance. Fourth, there is an
important market for share stakes and share stakes do not tend to be dispersed. Fifth, some of the characteristics
of the British system of corporate governance, such as the proxy voting and the one-tier board structure, further
strengthen the discretionary power of directors. Therefore, the main agency conflict emerging from the diffuse
ownership structure is the potential expropriation of shareholders by the management.1.      Introduction
This paper documents ownership structure and concentration of a random sample of UK companies.
The distribution of voting rights has important consequences on the agency costs between management and
majority and minority shareholders; and the effectiveness of corporate governance codes introduced over the
past years ought to be interpreted in this context. The paper also provides an overview of institutional and
legislative aspects of ownership and control; like the process of going public and the impact of voting rights
distribution of the mandatory bid rule
The European Directive on ownership transparency, officially known as “Council Directive
88/627/EEC on the information to be published when a major holding in a listed company is acquired or
disposed of”, required only limited changes to existing UK law. The UK has traditionally been the EU Member
State with the most extensive investor protection and most stringent rules on the disclosure of equity stakes.
The implementation of the Directive was regarded as ‘a harmonisation measure, which would “pull up” other
systems towards the UK standard’ (Dine 1994).
The implementation of EU ownership disclosure rules in Continental European countries has
highlighted the striking differences of the characteristics of ownership and voting rights with those of the UK.
The UK differs from her European partners not only in terms of a higher proportion of firms that are listed on
the stock exchange, but also in terms of ownership concentration and the main shareholder classes.
Furthermore, the UK is the only European country with an active (hostile) market for corporate control (Franks
and Mayer 1995).
Whereas a large majority of listed companies from Continental European countries have a dominating
outside shareholder or investment group, most UK firms are controlled by their insider shareholders (the
management and members of the board of directors). Share ownership could influence managerial behaviour in
two ways. On the one hand, ownership of equity changes the management’s incentives such that they pursue
share price maximising strategies. On the other hand, substantial ownership stakes may lead to expropriation of
minority shareholders. Managers owning a large percentage of voting rights might derive private benefits from
their executive and board positions, which they can insulate from monitoring and disciplinary actions in the
case of corporate underperformance. Therefore, large voting stakes held by insiders may not necessarily lead to
performance improvement. For the UK, Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (1998) show that disciplinary actionsagainst management are undertaken in the wake of poor performance, but directors owning large stakes
successfully impede board restructuring.
Hence, there is a need to reduce managerial discretionary power via regulation. The most recent
regulatory codes have been introduced in the form of auto-regulation.
1 The Cadbury (1992) Code, which the
London Stock Exchange required all listed companies to follow from 30 June 1993, lays down standards of
corporate governance and emphasizes the responsibilities of the board of directors, and more specifically the
monitoring role of non-executive directors. The Code of Best Practice for top executive remuneration, worked
out by the Greenbury Committee (1995), was a response to public criticism about directors receiving
remuneration packages perceived as excessive.
The UK is also very different from Continental Europe in terms of the importance of institutional
investors, which is much higher in the former. From 1963 to 1992, ownership of UK equities by institutional
shareholders has soared from around 30 per cent to 60 per cent (Stapledon 1996). This compares with
approximately 20 per cent of institutional ownership in Germany (Franks and Mayer 1995). Despite the fact
that a large percentage of the aggregate UK market capitalization is held by institutions, these institutional
investors are not major players from a principal-agent perspective. First, although their accumulated share
stakes are significant, shareholdings in individual companies are small: the average of the largest shareholding
owned by institutions amounts to a mere 5.5 per cent. Hence, the potential benefits from active monitoring of
UK corporations can hardly outweigh the costs of corporate control for institutions and urges institutions to free
ride on corporate control (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Second, some investment and pension funds adhere to
low-cost passive index strategies and consequently, do not dispose of the resources to actively monitor the large
number of companies in their portfolios. In order to remain cost-efficient, institutional investors prefer to divest
from poorly performing firms rather than to engage in active monitoring. A third reason for the low
institutional involvement is insider-trading regulations. If companies do not want to immobilize part of their
portfolios, they might have to restrict active involvement in corporate strategy. Plender (1997) reports that
institutions do not frequently exercise their voting rights: only about 28 per cent of pension funds cast their
votes on a regular basis, 21 per cent never vote and 32 per cent vote only on extraordinary items.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 discusses the different legal forms of
incorporation. In section 3 the legislation on ownership disclosure and the main elements on investor protection
are reviewed. Section 4 reports statistics on ownership of UK listed firms and analyses the importance ofdifferent investor categories. Section 5 focuses on the evolution of ownership concentration after the initial
public offering (IPO). The findings are contrasted with the evolution of ownership in German IPOs. Section 6
discusses the lack of separation devices in the UK. Finally, section 7 concludes this chapter.
2.      The corporate landscape
There are three types of classifications of companies in British commercial law:
- registered and unregistered companies,
- public and private companies, and
- limited and unlimited companies.
 A registered company is founded by registering certain documents – most importantly the articles of
association – with the Registrar of Companies, a public official. When a registered company is incorporated, it
becomes a ‘legal person’. Conversely, persons who conduct a business or a profession together, but have not
chosen to set up an incorporated company, form a ‘partnership’ (Partnership Act of 1890). Public companies
(PLCs) must be registered as such and their memorandum of association must state that they are a public
company. Currently, their minimum required share capital at creation is £50,000. Public companies must also
have at least two members whereas the EU Directive 89/667 permits the creation of private companies with
only one member (‘single member private limited company’). Only public companies can apply for a listing on
the London Stock Exchange. About 1,900 companies are listed on the London Stock Exchange. If financial
institutions, insurance companies, investment companies and real estate firms are excluded, the number of
listed companies on the London Stock Exchange amounts to 1,450 industrial and commercial firms.
 Registered companies can be of five different types:
- public companies limited by shares,
- private companies limited by shares,
- private companies limited by guarantee,
- private unlimited companies with share capital, and
- private unlimited companies without share capital.
The difference between limited and unlimited companies is, that in the case of liquidation, the
members of the former are only liable to the amount of the share capital or guarantee
2 they have brought intothe company, whereas the members of an unlimited company are liable to contribute to the debts and
obligations of the company until these are entirely met.
3.      Ownership legislation and investor protection regulation
3.1 History
The UK has a long tradition of disclosure regulations for shareholdings in companies. The first
legislation on disclosure dates back to 1945, when the Cohen Committee recommended that the beneficial
ownership of shares should be disclosed. Contrary to the EU Transparency Directive, UK legislation applies to
all public companies, and not only to the listed ones. UK Company Law also imposes a threshold of three per
cent
3 for stakes rather than the threshold of ten per cent as laid down in the Directive.
Every company has to keep a register of its members. Section 22 of the Companies Act of 1985
(hereafter CA 1985) defines the members of a company as all the persons who have subscribed to the
memorandum of association and all other persons who agree to become a member. Every member’s name and
address as well as the date at which he became a member and the date at which he may have ceased to be one
have to be entered into the register of members. If the company has a share capital, the number of shares each
member owns and the amount paid in must be specified in the register.
4
The register of shareholders does not necessarily reveal the true beneficial holdings as some ‘nominee’
companies may register the shares on behalf of a third party. A nominee company is used either to reduce
administrative costs by an institutional investor who holds shares on behalf of many individual investors or to
hide the true ownership. However, with regard to this last case, in practice, the company secretary in whose
company a substantial stake is held, is aware of the identity of the true owner.
3.2 Implementation of the EU Transparency Directive into UK Company Law
A. Introduction
The EU Transparency Directive 88/627/EEC was transposed into UK law by the Disclosure of Interests
in Shares (Amendment) Regulations of 1993 and the Disclosure of Interests in Shares (Amendment) (No 2)
Regulations of 1993.
5 The Regulations apply to interests in shares in the ‘relevant share capital’ of a public
company only. The relevant share capital is defined as the voting capital; i.e. the Regulations only refer to
interests of shares that carry ‘rights to vote in all circumstances at general meetings of the company’.
6B. Notification procedure
Rules applying to both listed and unlisted companies
A person
7 acquiring an equity stake of at least three per cent in a public company or ceasing to have
such an equity stake must notify that company in writing within two days of the change. The notification must
specify the share capital acquired and the number of shares. However, the notification does not have to specify
whether the interest is beneficial
8 or not. Increases or decreases in the stake require a new notification, if they
exceed one per cent.
9
In response to any notification received, the company has to record in its share register (also called
register of substantial shareholdings) the person’s name, the information contained in the notification as well as
the date of the recording. The change to the register has to be made within a period of three days following the
day of receipt of the notification. A person who fails to make a notification of his interests is ‘guilty of an
offence and liable to imprisonment or a fine, or both’. The competent authority is the Secretary of State or the
Director of Public Prosecutions (section 73).
In the example displayed in Figure 1, the Guinness Peat Group acquires eight per cent of the share
capital (and the voting rights) of Bluebird Toys. As the shares are held by different companies of the Group, a
‘nominee’ company is created which registers the nominal shares in its name to reduce administrative costs.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The members of the board of directors (both executive and non-executives) have to disclose their
interests and changes herein regardless of the number of shares.
10 The disclosed information on ownership is
kept in the register of directors’ interests and the register of substantial shareholdings, both of which are kept in
the same place by the company secretary. The registers have to be accessible to any member of the company or
any other person at no charge.
11 Both members and non-members
12 of the company have access to the register
of substantial interests free of charge. Non-members, however, may be charged a fee of £2.50 per hour (or part
of it) for the inspection of the register of directors’ interests. A person who requires copies of (part of) any of the
two registers will be charged a fee.
13Rules applying to listed companies only
Listed companies immediately have to inform the Company Announcements Office (CAO) of the
London Stock Exchange of any notifications of major interests received under sections 198 to 208 of the CA
1985. They have to specify the date of receipt of the notification and (if known) the date of the transaction.
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Listed companies also have to inform the CAO of any notification received relating to directors’ interests. They
must inform the CAO of the notification received as well as the date of the disclosure, the date and nature of the
transaction, the price, amount and class of securities, the nature and extent of the director’s interest in the
transaction.
3.3 Disclosure Thresholds and Notification of Family and Corporate Interests
A person is required to disclose his interests in a public company, as soon as he owns a beneficial stake
of three per cent of the nominal value of that class of capital or as soon as he controls a stake (whether
beneficial or not) of 10 per cent of the voting capital. Beneficial interests are all interests other than those
managed for other persons, those held by market makers in the course of their normal business, and those
managed for unit trusts and recognized schemes (section 199 CA 1985).
By law, a person is automatically interested in the shares that his spouse and infant children or stepchildren
hold (‘family interest’). He is also interested in shares held by a company of which he controls or exercises at
least one third of the voting rights at the general meeting or of which the directors are in the habit of following
his instructions (‘corporate interests’).
3.4 Concert parties and voting agreements
The ownership disclosure notification does not only apply to individuals or companies (including their
(wholly-owned) subsidiaries
15), but also extends to individuals and companies with voting-right agreements.
Such agreements between two or more persons give rise to the obligation of disclosure, if the target company is
a public company and if the combined shareholdings amount to at least three per cent.
16 These voting
agreements consist in obligations or restrictions between shareholders with respect to the use, retention or
disposal of the share stakes involved.
3.5 Takeover and merger regulationThe City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, introduced in 1968, provides some protection to the
minority shareholders of listed companies subject to takeovers. The Code is a set of self-regulatory rules issued
and administered by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, which consists of representatives of the main City
institutions such as the Stock Exchange. The Panel’s chairman and deputy chairman are appointed by the Bank
of England. The Code specifies that when a person holds at least 30 per cent of the voting rights of a company,
she must make a formal takeover bid, the ‘mandatory offer’, for the entirety of the voting shares. The price of
the mandatory offer has to be the highest price that the bidder paid for the target company’s shares during the
12 months preceding the date when her stake reached 30 per cent. If the offer is accepted within four months by
shareholders owning 90 per cent of the shares the offer relates to, the bidder has the right to acquire the
remaining ten per cent.
17
In the case of a rescue operation, the City Code can exempt a company from making a mandatory offer
(Keenan 1996). Such an exception was granted to Olivetti when it acquired around 49.3 per cent of the Acorn
Computer Group in 1985. Although Olivetti subsequently increased its holding to 79.8 per cent, Acorn
remained listed on the USM, the secondary market.
18
3.6 Minority shareholder protection
The UK is known for the high level of protection it provides to minority shareholders (Laporta et al.
1997). In the case of the UK, minority protection is derived from court rulings. The rule in Foss v Harbottle,
1843, stated that decisions in a company are taken by the majority of the shareholders and that individual
shareholders cannot normally appeal against such decisions. However, there are exceptions to this rule. The
exception that relates specifically to minority protection is the so-called ‘fraud on the minority’. This exception
covers what is typically known in agency theory as the expropriation of minority shareholders. The Court of
Appeal ruled in Menier v Hooper’s Telegraph Works Ltd, 1874, that the majority rule from Foss v Harbottle
may not apply, if the majority of shareholders intend to make a profit at the disadvantage of the minority
shareholders. A case for a claim can then be brought forward by a single minority shareholder.
19
3.7 Cross shareholdings and share repurchases
Companies who intend to reduce their share capital must do so through a special resolution (Section
135 of CA 1985),
20 approved by a majority of the three-quarters of the shareholders voting in person or byproxy. In addition, listed companies must also conform to the rules governing share repurchases laid down in
Chapter 15 of the Listing Rules. Repurchases have to be notified to the Company Announcements Office as
soon as possible and no later than 8.30 on the morning following the calendar day of the transaction.
Repurchases within a period of 12 months and covering less than 15 per cent of the equity can be made through
the stock market, under the condition that the price paid for the shares does not exceed the average market price
of shares during the 10 business days before the transaction by more than five per cent. Repurchases within a
period of 12 months covering more than 15 per cent of the equity must be made via a tender offer to all
shareholders. The tender offer must have a fixed price or a maximum price and has to be announced in at least
two national newspapers at least seven days before its closing date.
4.      Voting-right concentration in listed and unlisted companies.
4.1  Sample description
A sample of 250 companies was randomly selected from all the companies quoted on the London
Stock Exchange, excluding financial institutions, real estate companies, and insurance companies (the total
being about 1650 industrial and commericial companies). In order to study the ownership concentration across
time and in particular around the decrease in the disclosure threshold from  five to three per cent in 1989, data
were collected for a five-year period starting in 1988. In the last three years of the sample period, about seven
per cent of the companies in the sample were taken over and two per cent had their listing suspended, mostly
due to receivership. As no reliable public databases covering this period could be found, we collected the data
from the annual reports in hardcopy or microfiche format.
21
The shareholdings are classified into eight different categories: (1) banks, (2) insurance companies, (3)
investment trusts, unit trusts, and pension funds, (4) executive directors, (5) non-executive directors, (6)
industrial and commercial companies, (7) families and individuals (other than directors or their relatives), (8)
government stakes, and (9) real-estate companies. Directors’ stakes consist of both beneficial and non-
beneficial shares. For the cases where stakes were held by nominee companies, we identified in all cases the
investors behind the nominee companies via information provided by the company secretaries. Shareholdings
held through nominees were classified in function of the ownership category of the true owner.
Shareholders who own shares indirectly through subsidiaries are required to disclose their combined
direct and indirect shareholdings. We consider such stakes as an ultimate voting block. Voting pacts betweencorporate shareholders are rarely mentioned in the disclosure statements, although individuals (usually family
members) sometimes hold a share stake in common ownership.
22 The Companies Act requires large
shareholders to disclose their voting rights, rather than the actual ownership percentage. However, as dual-class
shares are rare, percentages of ownership (or of cash flow rights) and voting-right concentration are similar.
Hence, concentration of voting-rights and concentration of ownership are used interchangeably in this section.
4.2 Total ownership concentration
Panel A of Table 1 shows the sum of all ultimate voting blocks held by directors and by all substantial
shareholders, the latter being defined as owning total ultimate voting blocks of more than three per cent (five
per cent for 1988 and 1989). The sample companies were subdivided into two sub-samples: (1) companies
which were listed for more than five years on the London Stock Exchange, for simplicity called ‘established
firms’, and (2) companies brought to the stock exchange during the last five years, hence called ‘recent IPOs’
(not shown in Table 1).
23 We use three different ratios of concentration: CAll, the sum of all the ultimate voting
blocks held in the company, C1, the largest ultimate voting block, and finally a Herfindahl index based upon the
five largest blocks held.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
CAll in established companies amounts to around 30 per cent of the equity for the period 1988–9 and
increases substantially as of 1990 to an average of over 40 per cent for the period 1990–3 as a consequence of
reducing the disclosure threshold from five to three per cent. Panel A also reports that the average number of
large shareholders – with stakes of five per cent or more and three per cent or more, respectively – was three
during 1988–9 while about six shareholders disclosed large shareholdings of over three per cent in the period
1990–2. In recent IPOs (not shown), ownership concentration is substantially higher than in the established
companies: 41.7 per cent versus 28.2 per cent in 1988 and 48.0 per cent versus 40.6 per cent in 1990.
Table 2 shows that for 1992 the exclusion of voluntarily disclosed ultimate voting blocks that fall
below the compulsory threshold of three per cent causes only a marginal decrease in the concentration ratios.
Furthermore, the levels for CAll, C3, and C5 are very close.[Insert Table 2 about here]
4.3 The largest ultimate voting block
The largest ultimate voting block in established companies varies from 14.6 per cent to 16.5 per cent
(Panel B of Table 1), whereas it is about five per cent higher in recent IPOs. The percentile plot in Figure 2
shows the fraction of the sample companies by size of their largest ultimate voting block for the year 1992. The
fact that the percentiles are substantially below the quadrant intersection shows that the size distribution is not
normal and that ownership is diffuse in most sample companies.  Only in about 15 per cent of the sample
companies does the largest block exceed the blocking minority threshold of 25 per cent. This is in sharp
contrast with ownership concentration in Continental European countries: e.g. in Germany and Belgium the
largest shareholder or shareholder group owns a stake of 25 per cent or more in 85 and 93 per cent respectively
of listed companies (Franks and Mayer 1997; Renneboog 1997).
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Figure 3 depicts the size distribution of the largest shareholder. The median largest owner holds about
ten per cent. In 41 per cent of the sample companies does the largest shareholder own a stake of between five
and ten per cent. Small peaks at the 25–30 per cent range and the 75–80 per cent range indicate the value of
owning a blocking minority and super-majority respectively. However, in less than 15 per cent of the firms does
the largest shareholder hold stakes in excess of 30 per cent, which is the mandatory bid threshold. Given the
high dispersion of ownership, stakes of 15–20 per cent may already give a majority of the votes represented at
the annual shareholder meetings.
Our data show that voting blocks exceeding 30 per cent are usually held by families or individuals,
who are the founders or heirs to the founders of the firm. Out of a total of 200 sample companies in 1992, 18
companies have a shareholder controlling in excess of 30 per cent of the equity. Eleven of these 18 stakes are
owned by founding families. In addition, in eight companies a shareholder holds just under 30 per cent (29.8-
29.9%) of the votes. In all eight cases the shareholder is another company. This clearly shows that these
corporate shareholders are willing to hold as large an equity stake without transgressing the 30 per cent
threshold which would oblige them to undertake a takeover which is beyond their resources. [Insert Figure 3 about here]
4.4 Major shareholders
Figure 4
24 shows that the largest shareholder owns an average ultimate voting block of 14.4 per cent
(with a median of 9.9 per cent), whereas the second and third largest shareholders own average share stakes of
7.3 per cent and 6.0 per cent respectively. To challenge decisions of the largest shareholder, a voting agreement
between the second and third largest shareholder is needed. In the average company, 7 shareholders own stakes
of 3% or more. The fourth largest and the smaller shareholders hold, on average, 4.1% of the voting rights.
Hence, whereas the dominant shareholder in Continental companies is usually unchallenged, absolute control
would require the existence of a shareholder coalition in the average UK company. The average coalition of the
three largest shareholders would own 27.7 per cent and the combined shareholdings of all large shareholdings
are about 40 per cent. Panel C of Table 1 reports the Herfindahl indices, which measure ultimate voting block
concentration across the largest five shareholders. Total concentration remains relatively stable over time and
the relatively low values  for the indices reflect that the share stakes are spread out over several shareholders.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Consequently, the main potential agency conflict encountered in Anglo-American companies is of a
different type than the one encountered in Continental European firms. In the latter, expropriation of minority
shareholders may be the most important problem related to ownership concentration in such a way that strict
minority protection legislation is warranted. In contrast, lack of ownership concentration and control in Anglo-
American companies necessitates codes restricting the management from taking decisions to the detriment of
the shareholders.
4.5 The nature of ownership
Panel A of Table 3 reports the relative importance of nine categories of blockholders. The category
with the largest ultimate voting blocks (of over three per cent) is that of institutional investors, more specificallyinvestment and pension funds, who own a combined shareholding of over 21 per cent in the average company
25
and 19 per cent in recent IPOs.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Directors are the second most important category with an aggregate stake of about 11 per cent in
established companies and 22 per cent in recent IPOs. In companies which have been recently floated, the pre-
IPO owner, usually a family, keeps on average half of the original shares, which is equivalent to about one third
of the post-IPO outstanding share capital. In established companies 65 per cent of the average directors’
shareholdings are held by executives, while in recent IPOs three quarters of the combined directors’ holdings
are controlled by executive directors. The category of industrial and commercial companies holds an average
block of six per cent.
Panel B of Table 3 shows the average stake of the largest blockholder by type of owner.
26 The largest
blocks are held by industrial companies with an average of 12.5 per cent. Panel C of Table 3 reveals that if the
zero stakes are included (i.e. the average is calculated over all the companies in the sample), the power of
industrial companies is much less pronounced.
27
One of the most striking results in Table 3 is the relative power of directors. Combining the largest
shareholdings of executive and non-executive directors yields a stake, which ranges from 9.5 per cent to 11.6
per cent over the different years (Panel B). The size of directors’ shareholdings in a sample of recent IPOs is
even twice as high. All in all, the entire board, and in particular the executive directors, who own about 70 per
cent of all large directors’ holdings, own substantial voting power. In addition, directors can solicit proxy votes
from institutional investors. Plender (1997: 140) reports that 20 per cent of the votes by institutional
shareholders are proxy votes exercised by the company’s CEO at his discretion.
The largest blockholder class is that of investment and pension funds of which the largest ultimate
block amounts to more than seven per cent (Panel B). Ultimate blocks held by insurance companies and banks
are smaller at four per cent and 5.1 per cent, respectively (in 1992). Panel C reports that in 40.3 per cent of the
sample companies, institutional shareholders own the largest shareholding, but Panel B suggests that these
shareholdings in general do not exceed 15 per cent.
28Table 4 shows the institutional investors with the highest number of ultimate voting blocks in a sample
of 250 companies in 1992 and each institution’s average block. The five most frequently represented
institutions consist of two insurance companies, Prudential Corporation Group and Scottish Amicable Life
Insurance Society, who hold respectively 70 and 50 blocks (of at least three per cent), and of three investment
funds, Philips & Drew, Schroder, and M&G with more than 30 share stakes in a total of 250 listed companies.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
4.6 Changes in shareholdings
Table 5 reports changes in the concentration of ultimate voting blocks over time and shows whether
these changes are related to total voting block concentration. Both the annual increases and decreases are
recorded over the period 1990–2 in order to avoid changes due to the decrease in the disclosure threshold in
1989. In addition, a distinction is made between increases in voting rights held by new shareholders, who did
not own a substantial shareholding of at least three per cent in the preceding year, and those held by existing
substantial shareholders. Table 5 records a total of 925 purchases of blocks, 85 per cent of which were made by
new shareholders, and a total of 838 sales of at least three per cent over the whole sample period.
29 Ninety-eight
blocks of a minimum of ten per cent were acquired and 80 were sold in a sample of 250 listed companies.
Consequently, there exists a market for share blocks in the UK, as in about 12 per cent of the sample companies
substantial share stakes of ten per cent or more are acquired.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 6 reveals that during the period 1990–2, investment funds and insurance companies actively
traded substantial share blocks: in 48.7 per cent of all sample companies did investment funds and insurance
companies sell stakes within the size bracket [3%, 25%], whereas in 50.5 per cent of the companies stakes of a
similar size were purchased. Executive directors acquired major shareholdings in about ten per cent of the
sample companies whereas they decreased their holdings in 11.4 per cent of the companies. Industrial
companies traded large share blocks in about 12 per cent of the sample.
[Insert Table 6 about here]4.7 Ownership concentration in unlisted companies
A sample of 12,600 unlisted companies was drawn from the Jordan’s database (Amadeus Cd-Rom
supplied by Bureau Van Dijk, Brussels)  for the year 1996. In about 78 per cent of these unlisted companies, the
entire share capital is held by a single shareholder. In the remainder of the sample, one shareholder holds a
majority stake of 50 per cent (Figure 5).
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
5.      Evolution of ownership
The previous section documented that the vast majority of non-listed UK companies have a high ownership
concentration whereas most listed companies have a dispersed ownership structure. This raises the question as to how
long it takes for a newly floated firm to reach a diffuse shareholding structure and reach the separation of ownership
and control as defined by Berle and Means (1932). Two studies – the studies by Brennan and Franks (1997) and
Goergen (1998) – address this question and analyse the evolution of ownership and control in UK firms from the
moment of their flotation. Brennan and Franks find that for their sample of 69 IPOs seven years after going public on
average two thirds of the equity is owned by new shareholders.
Goergen (Table 7) finds that UK firms reach low levels of ownership concentration more rapidly than their
German counterparts. German IPOs, floated by individuals between 1981-88, were matched with UK IPOs of a similar
size or industry, also floated by individuals. A third of the UK IPOs are taken over within six years of going public, a
third become widely held and a third remain controlled by the family shareholder.
30 Five years subsequent to the IPO,
the old shareholders of a German corporation still own  a majority of the voting rights, while old shareholders in UK
companies own less then one third of the equity. This study also reports that at the time of the IPO UK firms tend to be
on average 14 years old whereas German firms are floated only about 50 years after their creation.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
6.      Lack of separation devices
Although some devices to separate ownership and control – such as non-voting shares – are legally permitted
in the UK, firms tend to avoid them for two reasons. First, their use has been discouraged by institutional shareholdersas well as by officials from the London Stock Exchange. Second, the high dispersion of corporate ownership does not
stimulate the creation of legal devices to separate ownership from control. In this section, we first discuss the type of
legal separation devices that are available in the UK and the reasons why these devices are not normally used by
companies. Second, we examine how the substantial power of company directors is further increased by the
characteristics of the UK system of corporate governance.
6.1 Non-voting shares and restrictions on the transfer of shares
Although UK companies are legally entitled to issue non-voting shares, the issue of such shares is rare,
especially for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange.
31 Brennan and Franks (1997) state that ‘[…]
investing institutions and the London Stock Exchange have discouraged the issuance of non-voting shares and
other devices for discriminating against different shareholders’. Also, the majority of the few companies that
had still non-voting shares – such as Boots, Great Universal Stores, and Whitbread – cancelled them at the
beginning of the 1990s. As the London Stock Exchange does not allow any restrictions on the transfer of
shares, such restrictions can only be found in the articles of unlisted companies, especially private companies
(Keenan 1996).
6.2 Proxy voting
The board of directors often sends proxy forms to the shareholders. The Listing Rules require that proxy
forms ‘provide for two-way voting on all resolutions intended to be proposed […]’, i.e. shareholders must always be
offered the choice to vote for or against any resolution. However, shareholders are free to appoint their own proxy, and
are not required to use the proxy form provided by the board of directors.
32 If a shareholder does not specify how the
proxy should vote on the different issues, the proxy will be free to vote how he pleases.
Proxy voting in the UK differs from proxy voting in Germany. In Germany, proxy votes are normally exercised by the
bank, with which a shareholder deposits his shares. If the shareholder does not express his voting intentions, the bank
is free to vote as it pleases. Conversely, in the UK, proxy votes are normally exercised by company directors and hence
confer them with additional power. Davies and Prentice (1997: 580) argue that the provision of two-way voting does
not prevent this increase in the power of directors:
It cannot be said, however, that these provisions have done much to curtail the tactical advantages possessed
by the directors. They still strike the first blow and their solicitation of proxy votes is likely to meet with a substantialresponse before the opposition is able to get under way. Even if their proxies are in the “two-way” form, many
members will complete and lodge them after hearing but one side of the case, and only the most intelligent or obstinate
are likely to withstand the impact of the, as yet, uncontradicted assertions of the directors. It is, of course, true that once
opposition is aroused members may be persuaded to cancel their proxies, for these are merely appointments of agents
and the agents’ authority can be withdrawn either expressly or by personal attendance and voting. But in practice this
rarely happens.
6.3 Voting at shareholders’ meetings
The way voting at shareholders’ meetings is carried out can further enhance the directors’ power over the
shareholders. Unless a resolution is controversial, voting is normally done by show of hands only. Consequently, each
shareholder has only one vote whatever the size of his stake in the firm’s equity. Proxy votes are excluded from this
vote by hand, unless the articles of association state otherwise. The chairman has complete discretion to decide
whether an item on the agenda is controversial or not. If an item is controversial, a poll can be taken, even before a
vote by hand has been held. In a poll, shareholders will have as many votes as their shares confer and proxy voting is
allowed.
The voting procedure at AGMs, i.e. the showing of hands, is probably one of the weaknesses of the British
system of corporate governance. Minority shareholders typically do not attend the AGM and proxy voting is only
allowed in a poll. As British company directors normally hold shares in their firms, they will be voting by show of
hands along with other shareholders attending the AGM and can therefore decide on corporate issues in their proper
interest.
6.4 One-tier board structure
Contrary to German public companies (Aktiengesellschaften), UK public companies do not have a two-tier
board structure. Both executive and non-executive directors sit on the same board and the chairman of the board can
be an executive director.
33 One of the main recommendations of the Cadbury (1992) report is to increase the
independence of the non-executive directors vis-à-vis the executive directors. To this end, the report recommends an
increase in the proportion of non-executive directors and the separation of the roles of the chairman and the chief
executive. Stapledon (1996) shows that the proportion of non-executive directors in quoted industrial companies has
been increasing from 30 per cent in 1979 to 44 per cent in 1993. Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (1998) confirm thatexecutive directors still outnumber non-executive directors in listed industrial companies (60% versus 40%). Although
the proportion of listed firms with separate chairmen and chief executives increased substantially, 23 per cent of firms
still do not separate the two roles. These firms may suffer from a serious lack of monitoring of their board of directors.
Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (1998) report that corporate restructuring triggered by poor corporate performance
usually leads to a strengthening of the independence of the non-executive directors from management.
The Hampel Committee – chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel, the chairman of ICI – was set up at the end of
1995 as the successor to the Cadbury Committee. The Hampel Committee has raised the issue of whether the UK
should move towards a system with a two-tier board structure. The Committee is also considering whether institutional
investors should be obliged to vote at shareholders’ meetings as it is already the case in the USA. Unfortunately, the
Committee seems to favour a non-interventionist approach rather than the laying-down of compulsory rules.
6.5 The market for corporate control
Theoreticians argue that badly-performing managers will eventually be disciplined by the market for
corporate control (see e.g. Manne 1965). If a company performs badly, then it should be worthwhile for an
investor to take control over the company and increase shareholder value by substituting the management.
Along with the US, the UK is one of the few countries with an active market for corporate control. Franks,
Mayer and Renneboog (1998) report that on average every year four per cent of the listed UK companies are
taken over. Franks and Mayer (1996) argue that there was a total of 80 hostile takeover bids during 1985–6.
This compares with only three hostile takeovers in Germany after WWII.
However, two recent empirical studies by Franks and Mayer (1996) on the UK and Comment and
Schwert (1997) on the US have questioned the disciplining role of takeovers. The studies agree that the pre-
takeover performance of targets of hostile bids is not significantly different from the one of targets of friendly
bids or the one of non-merging firms. This suggests that the main disciplining device of badly performing
managers does not work efficiently and that managers are in general free to do whatever they choose to do.
7. Conclusion
The ownership structure of listed companies in the UK is very different from the one of Continental
European listed firms. The first striking feature is that ownership of the average company is diffuse: a coalition
of at least eight shareholders is required to reach an absolute majority of voting rights. Even though the averagefirm has a dispersed ownership, the reader should bear in mind that there are about ten per cent of firms where
the founder or his heirs are holding more than 30 per cent. The ownership structure is also shaped by
regulation; the mandatory takeover threshold of 30%, for example,  has an important impact on the ownership
structure. In about 4% of sample companies, corporate shareholders hold just under 30 per cent of the shares.
Second, institutional investors are the most important category of shareholders. However, they tend to follow
passive strategies and often do not exercise the votes attached to their shares. Third, the passive stance adopted
by institutions increases the already significant power of directors, who are the second most important category
of shareholders. Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (1998) show that when directors own substantial shareholdings,
they use their voting power to entrench their positions and they can impede monitoring actions taken by other
shareholders to restructure the board, even in the wake of poor corporate performance. Fourth, there is an
important market for share stakes and share stakes do not tend to be dispersed. Fifth, some of the characteristics
of the British system of corporate governance, such as the proxy voting and the one-tier board structure, further
strengthen the discretionary power of directors. Therefore, the main agency conflict emerging from the diffuse
ownership structure is the potential expropriation of shareholders by the management.
Corporate governance mechanisms such as hostile takeovers (Franks and Mayer 1996) and the market
for share stakes (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 1998) do not seem to operate well in the UK. Consequently, it
seems to be clear that a larger proportion of independent non-executive directors or a separate supervisory
committee are required to curb the potential agency conflicts between a company’s management and its
shareholders. Remuneration plans linking managerial compensation directly to performance will also result in a
better alignment of managerial and shareholder goals. A stricter legal definition of the fiduciary duty of
directors will allow courts to rule more efficiently on directors’ responsibilities. The Cadbury (1992)
Committee, the Greenbury (1995) Committee and, currently the Hampel Committee have proposed codes of
corporate governance and remuneration. The establishment of an independent regulatory body advising the pay-
for-performance issue, controlling board composition, governing minority protection will ensure a limit to the
potential UK agency conflicts.Notes :
1 One of the distinctive features of the UK capital market is its self-regulatory character. Both the City and the
London Stock Exchange are subject to auto-regulation (see Franks et al., 1997).
2 The difference between a share capital and a guarantee is that at least part of the former has to be paid up
before winding up the company. The guarantee is only due at liquidation if the liquidation value is lower than
the guaranteed capital. Since 1980, only private companies can be created by guarantee.
3 The threshold was five per cent from 1985 until 1989.
4 Although not all shareholders may be members of the company, in practice, membership of a company is in
most cases equal to owning a shareholding. In the remainder of the paper, we will use shareholder instead of
member.
5 The Regulations were published in issues no. 1993/1819 and no. 1993/2689 respectively of Statutory
Instruments. They were made on 20 July 1993 and came into force on 18 September 1993. The Regulations are
an amendment to Part VI - the part on the Disclosure of Interests in Shares - of the Companies Act 1985 (as
well as to section 210A which was added to the Companies Act 1985 through section 134 of the Companies Act
1989).
6 The relevant share capital also includes voting shares whose voting rights have been temporarily suspended.
7 In the following sections of this chapter, we will be using the term ‘person’ as it is used in UK Company Law.
This term as well as the pronouns ‘he’ and ‘him’ do not only refer to ‘individuals’, but also to ‘body corporates’
(companies). See Mayson, French and Ryan (1996), section 0.1.9 ‘A note on terminology’ for more detail.
Legal texts use the term ‘individual’, if corporations are to be excluded.
8 Company Law uses the term ‘material’ rather than ‘beneficial’. Beneficial refers to the fact that the person
enjoys all the proprietary rights. In the case of a listed bearer shares with voting rights, the main rights are:
voting at the general assembly,  receiving dividends and the right to dispose of the shares. Non-beneficial
shares are held by a trustee, usually for a family, charity or corporation who will receive dividends.
9 If a person’s interest drops below the three per cent threshold, he must notify the company. Any subsequent
decreases do not require a notification.
10 See section 324 of the CA 1985. If a director has also an interest in his company that exceeds the thresholds
laid down in section 199 for substantial shareholdings, he will have to make two distinct notifications.11 According to section 234 of the CA 1985, the directors of a company have the obligation to prepare for each
financial year the directors' report, which specifies changes in directors' and others' interests as well as the
acquisition of its own shares by the company. The directors' report is released along with the company accounts
to (section 238): 'every member of the company, every holder of the company's debentures, and every person
who is entitled to receive notice of general meetings'.
12 In companies which issued shares, these are respectively shareholders and non-shareholders.
13 If a person requires copies of (part of) the registers, the company has to send the copies to the person within a
period of ten days following the day of the request subject to an administrative charge. If a company refuses to
satisfy such a request or does not satisfy the request within the period of ten days, the company and any of its
officers are liable to a fine on a daily basis. If the company refuses to satisfy a request, 'the court may by order
compel an immediate inspection of it; and in the case of failure to send a copy required [...], the court may by
order direct that the copy required shall be sent to the person requiring it'. The fee payable for copies of the
register of interests in shares and the register of directors' interests is specified in the Companies (Inspection
and Copying of Registers, Indices and Documents) Regulations 1991 and is: £2.50 for the first 100 entries (or
part of them), £20.00 for the following 1000 entries (or part of them) and £15.00 for each additional 1000
entries (or part of them).
14 Under section 212 of the CA 1985, a public company can request a person (individual or company) it knows
or suspects to be interested in its voting share capital to declare whether or not it is the case. The company may
also be asked by its members representing at least ten per cent of the paid-up voting capital (on the date of the
request) to launch such a request under section 212 of the CA 1985. If the company does not comply with the
request by its members, the company as well as its officers who are in default will be liable to a fine.
15 The Companies Act of 1989 (hereafter CA 1989) lays down the definitions of a parent company, a wholly-
owned subsidiary, a holding company and a subsidiary. A wholly-owned subsidiary is a company that does not
have any members apart from the parent company, the parent company’s wholly owned subsidiaries or persons
acting on behalf of the parent company or any of its wholly-owned subsidiaries. A company is a subsidiary of
another company, the holding company, if the latter holds the majority of the voting rights, is a member of it
and appoints a majority of the directors, or is a member of it and controls the majority of the votes in
accordance with an agreement with the other members or shareholders. Parent companies are required to
publish consolidated accounts.16 See section 204 of the CA 1985. Birds et al. (1995) argue that ‘section 204 is the statutory equivalent of the
City Code rules in respect of ‘concert parties’ in the context of a takeover bid’. The City Code will be discussed
in detail in section 3.5.
17 See Part XIIIA of the CA 1985.
18 The USM (Unlisted Securities Market) required companies to have at least 10 per cent of their listed class of
shares widely held. The proportion is 25 per cent for the Official List.
19 Keenan (1996) provides a good discussion of the principles governing minority protection.
20 Additional details on creditor protection, reduction of share capital below the authorized minimum, etc. can
be found in Part V, Chapter IV of the CA 1985.
21 The London Stock Exchange (LSE) covers the changes in an on-line Regulatory News Service but does not
store any information. These LSE data are collected and stored by Extel Financial, which cannot make data
accessible electronically but publishes a Weekly Official Intelligence Report. Copies of the hardcopy
notifications have been available since 1992 at substantial cost (for this information £15,000 is charged). The
Jordan’s database on ownership can provide a one-year snapshot as old data are overwritten. Backup copies of
historical data are not available. For current ownership, we used Jordan’s database which contains information
on 1,580 listed companies. However, the analysis of these data did not yield results compatible with the more
detailed analysis of the random sample. Closer analysis revealed that this database might contain many
misclassified companies and we therefore did not consider this database to be suitable for this study. All in all,
databases providing a good overview of shareholdings and reliable historical databases are not available for our
sample period. Newspaper coverage (e.g. through the Financial Times) of substantial shareholdings or
directors’ holdings is far from comprehensive and cannot be used for research purposes.
22 Data on voting rights pacts are not available in annual reports over the sample period and there is only
sporadic newspaper coverage of voting pacts.
23  For instance, for the year 1990, the recent IPO sample consists of 30 companies which were introduced on
the stock exchange after 1985. The sample size of recent IPOs decreases from year to year as companies which
were floated in 1983 are still in the IPO sub-sample until the year 1988, but are put in the sample of established
companies as of 1989. In addition, some companies are taken over, go into receivership or have missing data.24 For all companies the shareholdings of three per cent or more are collected for all shareholders, apart from
those held by directors for whom all shareholdings were obtained. However, in this figure only blocks of at least
three per cent are taken into account.
25 The substantial change from 10.6 per cent in 1989 to 19.5 per cent in 1990 is due to the fact that on average
two additional institutional investors start disclosing their shareholdings as the threshold has been reduced to
three per cent in this period.
26 For each category of owner, the largest share stake was recorded (if available). The number of largest
shareholdings by category is used as denominator.
27 Table A2 (appendix) shows the size distribution of the aggregate ultimate voting blocks and the largest block
by type of owner for the whole sample period 1988-92.
28 In panel C of Table 3, the average of largest voting blocks by class of owner is divided, not by the total
number of largest shareholdings by class as in panel B but by the number of sample companies. As pension
funds own share stakes in almost all listed companies of our sample, the average largest shareholding does not
differ much from the one in panel B and amounts to about seven per cent. Both executive directors and
industrial companies have largest shareholdings with an average of more than five per cent.
29 These numbers are an underestimation of the true changes in blocks: the table does not record purchases
which take place during the year and are sold off before the end of the fiscal year.
30 A company is controlled by its family shareholder, if the later owns the largest stake in the company and the
stake exceeds at least 25 per cent of the voting equity.
31 The Listing Rules (Chapter 13) do not prohibit the issue of non-voting shares and restricted voting shares.
However, such shares must be clearly marked.
32 Section 372 of CA 1985 specifies that any shareholder, entitled to vote at a meeting, can appoint a proxy of
his choice.
33 Stapledon (1996, pp.144-145) distinguishes three different cases: (1) the chairman and the chief executive
officer are the same person; (2) the chairman is an executive and there is a separate chief executive; (3) the
chairman is a former executive director of the company.List of References
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th edition.Table 1. Concentration ratios for ultimate voting blocks
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Call : Sum of all voting blocks
__________________________________________________________________________________________
 Year Sample  Mean Minimum  Quartile Median Quartile Maximum Avg. number
size   % % 25% % 75% % of shareholders
__________________________________________________________________________________________
1988 200 28.2 0.0 5.6 23.6 45.1 90.4 3.1
1989 208 30.2 0.0 9.8 25.7 48.4 86.5 3.4
1990 220 40.6 0.0 21.4 39.1 58.2 96.6 5.7
1991 227 42.9 0.0 24.9 42.3 60.5 99.2 6.3
1992 200 40.8 0.0 26.7 39.0 53.7 98.2 6.2
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. C1 : Largest voting block
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Year Sample  Mean Minimum  Quartile Median Quartile Maximum 
size % % 25% % 75% %
__________________________________________________________________________________________
1988 200 14.6 0.0 4.9 10.6 22.8 86.5
1989 208 15.3 0.0 5.9 11.6 22.9 86.5
1990 220 16.5 0.0 7.2 12.1 23.7 86.4
1991 227 15.8 0.0 7.6 11.8 20.4 79.2
1992 200 15.2 0.0 7.0 10.9 19.6 78.9
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel C. Herfindahl index measuring the concentration of the largest 5 ultimate outside voting blocks
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Year Sample  Mean Minimum  Quartile Median Quartile Maximum
size   % % 25% % 75% %
__________________________________________________________________________________________
1988 200 10.4 0.0 2.3 6.6 12.3 38.7
1989 208 10.7 0.0 3.3 7.0 12.5 38.7
1990 220 11.2 0.0 5.2 7.5 12.5 38.6
1991 227 10.9 0.0 5.3 7.6 12.0 35.4
1992 200 10.5 0.0 5.2 7.2 11.2 35.3
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: This table shows the mean, median and quartiles of the aggregate of all substantial shareholdings of at
least 5% (1988–9) or 3% (1990–2). Panel B shows the average and median largest shareholding while Panel C
reports the Herfindahl index of the largest 5 shareholders. The Herfindahl index is defined as the square root of
1/5 of the sum of squares of the largest 5 shareholders. Established companies are defined as companies
introduced to the London Stock Exchange at least 5 years prior.
Source: Own calculations based on annual reports.Table 2. Concentration ratios for ultimate voting blocks for 1992 (excluding stakes below 3%)
Measure Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
C1 : Largest blocks  14.44 12.59 3.40 78.90
C3 : 3 largest blocks 26.84 15.23 3.70 78.90
C5 : 5 largest blocks 32.99 16.35 3.70 84.68
Call : all voting blocks 37.25 18.65 3.70 96.31
__________________________________________________________________________________________Table 3. Ultimate voting blocks by blockholder type
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Sample Size 200 208 220 227 200
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Sum of ultimate voting blocks by blockholder type (%)
Banks 0.1 0.4 1.2 1.8 1.9
Insurance firms 2.8 2.9 5.4 5.8 5.9
Investment/Pension funds 6.4 7.3 12.9 14.2 14.2
Total Institutions 9.3 10.6 19.5 21.8 22.0
Executive directors 7.3 7.7 7.9 7.4 5.8
Non-executive directors 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.6 4.1
Total directors 11.1 11.5 12.4 12.0 9.9
Industrial companies 5.7 6.0 6.2 5.8 6.1
Families and individuals 1.8 2.0 2.4 3.2 2.5
Government  0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Real Estate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Sum of blocks 28.2 30.2 40.6 42.9 40.8
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Average ultimate voting block of the largest blockholder (%)
(the denominator excludes companies with no reported shareholdings for the shareholder category)
Banks 6.0 7.6 4.5 4.5 5.1
Insurance firms 5.3 5.4 3.6 3.8 4.0
Investment/Pension funds 8.1 7.4 6.8 7.0 7.0
Executive directors 5.3 5.4 5.8 5.5 4.5
Non-executive directors 6.3 5.9 5.5 5.7 5.0
Industrial companies 14.9 14.5 12.0 10.6 10.6
Families and individuals 5.8 6.3 5.3 4.9 5.2
Government  13.3 6.9 5.5 5.7 6.7
Real Estate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel C. Average ultimate voting block of the largest blockholder (%)
(the denominator includes companies with no reported shareholdings for the shareholder category)
Banks 0.1 0.4 1.0 1.6 1.8
Insurance firms 2.2 2.3 3.6 3.8 4.0
Investment/Pension funds 4.6 5.1 6.8 7.0 7.0
Executive directors 5.3 5.4 5.8 5.5 4.1
Non-executive directors 3.1 3.0 3.4 3.4 2.9
Industrial companies 5.0 5.1 5.5 5.1 5.4
Families and individuals 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.0 1.6
Government  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Real Estate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel D. Number of ultimate voting blocks by blockholder type
Banks 2 11 49 80 71
Insurance firms 83 89 218 259 226
Investment/Pension funds 114 144 435 514 474
Executive directors 215 235 249 240 184
Non-executive directors 98 105 137 135 117
Industrial companies 67 73 101 109 102
Families and individuals 45 46 67 92 61
Government  3 3 4 4 6
Real Estate 0 0 0 0 1
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: This table shows, by category of owner, the aggregate ultimate voting blocks (panel A), the average
largest ultimate voting block with as denominator (i) the total number of largest ultimate voting blocks by type
of holder (panel B) and (ii) the total number of sample companies (panel C), and the number of blockholders
(panel D).  Blocks below 3% are excluded from this table.
(1) : The averages of panel B are calculated with a denominator which excludes the companies with no reported
shareholdings of the specified shareholder category. (2) : The averages of panel C are calculated with a
denominator which includes the companies with no reported shareholdings of the specified shareholder
category.  Source: Own calculations based on annual reports.Table 4. Main institutional investors in a random sample of 250 listed companies in 1992
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Institutional investors Number of ultimate   Average ultimate
voting blocks voting block (%)
Prudential Corporation Group 70 5.5
Scottish Amicable Life Insurance Society 50 6.2
Philips & Drew Fund Management  41 4.7
Schroder Investment Management 36 5.7
M&G Investment Management 31 8.6
Barclays Bank 29 4.4
Brittanic Insurance 25 5.6
Guardian Royal Exchange 25 6.0
Norwich Union Life Assurance 24 4.1
Prudential Portfolio Managers 18 4.6
Robert Fleming Holdings 15 5.2
TSB Group 15 4.9
Morgan Grenfell Group 13 4.0
Postel Investment Management 13 4.7
3i Group 12 8.1
Framlington Group 12 5.1
Standard Life Assurance 11 3.8
AMP Asset Management 10 4.3
Sun Alliance 10 4.8
Confederation Life group 9 5.3
Scottish Widows Fund and Life Assurance 9 3.2
Fidelity Investment 8 5.8
Imperial Group Pension Investments 8 4.7
Pearl Assurance 8 4.3
Royal Insurance 6 3.4
TR Smaller Companies Investment Trust 6 6.5
Edinburgh Fund Managers 5 5.8
Equitable Life Assurance 5 4.0
Abberforth Partners 5 5.6
Henderson Administration Group 5 4.0
Invesco MIM 5 3.2
Provident Mutual Life Assurance 4 7.1
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: annual reportsTable 5. Number of new large ultimate voting blocks and number of changes in existing ultimate voting
blocks by ownership concentration in 1990–2
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Size of change  [3%,5%[ [5%,10%[ [10%,15%[ [15%,25%[ [25%,50%[ >50%
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Number of firms with new shareholdings by size of change and by total ownership concentration
Total ownership concentration
<15% 67 20 7 1 2 0
[15%,25%[ 63 25 5 3 1 0
[25%,35%[ 106 41 8 3 2 0
[35%,50%[ 143 60 9 4 3 0
>50% 134 75 19 11 4 0
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Number of firms with increases in existing shareholdings by size and ownership concentration.
Total ownership concentration
<15% 1 1 0 2 0 0
[15%,25%[ 4 3 1 1 1 0
[25%,35%[ 9 7 1 0 0 0
[35%,50%[ 18 6 5 0 2 0
>50% 26 18 2 1 0 0
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel C . Number of firms with decreases in existing shareholdings by size and ownership concentration.
Total ownership concentration
<15% 33 12 1 0 0 0
[15%,25%[ 53 14 2 2 0 0
[25%,35%[ 97 45 6 4 0 0
[35%,50%[ 184 76 12 8 3 0
>50% 151 93 17 16 7 2
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: This table reports the number of changes in shareholdings by size for different total shareholding
concentrations over the period 1990–2. Panel A reports the number of large new shareholdings by size class;
panel B and C reflect the number of increases and decreases in substantial shareholdings by size and ownership
concentration. The total sample consists of 250 companies.
Source: Own calculations based on data from annual reportsTable 6. Number of changes of ownership by blockholder type
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Number and percentage of sample firms with sales of ultimate voting blocks
[3%,5%[ [5%,25%[ [25%,50%[ >=50%
________________ ________________ ________________ ___________
Banks 60 8.0% 21 2.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Insurance firms 152 20.3% 45 6.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Investment funds 213 28.4% 123 16.4% 1 0.1% 0 0.0%
Executive directors 25 3.3% 31 4.1% 4 0.5% 0 0.0%
Non-exec. directors 12 1.6% 18 2.4% 2 0.3% 0 0.0%
Industrial firms 32 4.3% 48 6.4% 3 0.4% 2 0.3%
Families and individuals 24 3.2% 22 2.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Number and percentage of sample firms with purchases of ultimate voting blocks
[3%,5%[ [5%,25%[ [25%,50%[ >=50%
________________ ________________ ________________ ___________
Banks 55 7.3% 23 3.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Insurance firms 148 19.7% 43 5.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Investment funds 231 30.8% 178 23.7% 1 0.1% 0 0.0%
Executive directors 32 4.3% 15 2.0% 1 0.1% 0 0.0%
Non-exec. directors 16 2.1% 11 1.5% 2 0.3% 0 0.0%
Industrial firms 46 6.1% 45 6.0% 9 1.2% 0 0.0%
Families and
individuals 43 5.7% 24 3.2% 2 0.3% 0 0.0%
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: This table shows the number of sample companies with sales and purchases of substantial shareholdings
over the period 1990–2 (after the decrease in disclosure threshold). The sample consists of 250 listed
companies. The numbers of sample companies are cumulative over 3 years. The columns with percentages
indicate the percentage of sample companies with a change in share stake owned by a particular class. Panel A
shows decreases in share stakes and panel B shows the increases.
Source: Annual reportsTable 7. Average proportion of voting rights held by the old and new shareholders in 55 German and UK
IPOs matched by market capitalisation
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Time after IPO Country Old shareholders New shareholders Undisclosed hands
Imme- Germany 76.4%* 1.5%*** 22.2%*
diately UK 62.8% 0.1% 37.2%
(55,3.292,55) (55,1.874,55) (55,-3.797,55)
1 year Germany 73.7%* 2.4% 24.0%*
UK 51.4% 5.5% 43.1%
(55,4.666,54) (55,-1.452,54) (55,-4.615,54)
2 years Germany 69.6%* 5.4%** 25.0%*
UK 47.3% 13.3% 39.5%
(54,4.288,53) (54,-2.513,53) (54,-3.435,53)
3 years Germany 64.9%* 9.8%* 25.3%**
UK 37.7% 26.4% 36.0%
(49,4.490,48) (49,-2.825,48) (49,-2.267,48)
4 years Germany 59.4%* 15.5%** 25.0%**
UK 33.6% 28.8% 37.6%
(42,3.919,41) (42,-2.019,41) (42,-2.508,41)
5 years Germany 50.7%* 23.1% 26.3%**
UK 31.4% 32.1% 36.5%
(37,2.705,36) (37,-1.176,36) (37,-2.001,36)
6 years Germany 45.0%** 30.2% 24.8%*




(a) German sample size, t-statistic for the difference in means and UK sample size in parentheses.
(b) The samples are balanced samples, i.e. if one firm drops out of one sample, the matching firm from the
other country is withdrawn.
(c) * Indicates that the difference in means is significantly different from zero at the one per cent level for the
two-tailed test.  ** Indicates that the difference in means is significantly different from zero at the five per
cent level for the two-tailed test.  *** Indicates that the difference in means is significantly different from
zero at the ten per cent level for the two-tailed test.
Source: Goergen (1998)Figure 1.         Disclosure of ultimate voting block.
LETTER TO BLUEBIRD TOYS PLC FROM GUINNESS PEAT GROUP
   :: Disclosure of Interest in Shares Pursuant to Sections 198 to 202 of The
Companies Act 1985
   Guinness Peat Group plc and its subsidiary companies (''the Group'') hereby
notify Bluebird Toys Plc (''Bluebird'') that following the market purchase of
660,000 Ordinary shares on 23 July 1997 at the price of 91p, the Group's
interest in the shares of Bluebird amounts to 3,327,000 shares representing
8.00% of the issued share capital.
   The additional shares will be presented for registration in the name of
Sutherland Nominees Limited.
   So far as the Group is aware, no person intersted in the shares is party to
any agreement or arrangement relating to the exercise of any rights conferred
by holding the shares subject to this notification.
   From Guinness Peat Group plcFigure 2. Percentile Plot of Largest Voting Blocks in UK Listed firms.
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Source: Annual reports for a sample of 250 randomly selected companies.Figure 4. Ultimate Voting Blocks by Rank for 1992
Notes: Blocks below 3% are excluded.
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Table A1. Types of company
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Limited Minimum capital Minimum  Register of Register of Register of Transfer of shares
liability number of members substantial directors’
members shareholders interests
Public company
Limited by shares Yes £50,000 2 Yes Yes Yes no restrictions
(only ¼ needs  allowed if listed
to be paid-up) company
Private company
Limited by shares
a Yes No 1 Yes No Yes articles can impose
restrictions
Limited by Yes No, guarantee 1 Yes No Yes NA
guarantee




share capital No No 2 Yes No Yes articles can impose
restrictions
Unlimited without




b Yes No 2 Yes No Yes articles can impose
restrictions
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
a The Companies (Single Member Private Limited Companies) Regulations 1992 reduced the minimum number of members from 2 to 1.
b This type of company, also called ‘hybrid company’, could only be registered until 22 December 1980.39 39
Appendix A2
Table A2. Size distribution of the aggregate and largest ultimate voting block by type of blockholder
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Aggregate ultimate voting blocks by type of owner 1988–92
__________________________________________________________________________________________
  Total  ]0%,5%[ [5%,15%[ [15%,25%[ [25%,50%[ [50%,75%[ [75%,100%[
Banks 14.4% 8.8% 4.3% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Insurance 47.3% 10.5% 31.7% 3.5% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Investment funds 58.2% 6.4% 26.5% 12.6% 10.1% 2.7% 0.0%
 
Executive directors 75.1% 42.2% 14.0% 6.8% 8.4% 3.3% 0.4%
Non-executive
directors 42.0% 21.6% 9.5% 5.1% 4.3% 1.4% 0.0%
 
Industrial firms  28.6% 5.1% 15.2% 4.9% 1.6% 1.2% 0.4%
Families and
individuals 15.4% 2.1% 6.8% 3.3% 3.1% 0.0% 0.2%
Government 1.4% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0%
Real estate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Largest ultimate voting block by type of owner 1988-92
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Total  ]0%,5%[ [5%,15%[ [15%,25%[ [25%,50%[ [50%,75%[ [75%,100%[
Banks 1.6% 0.2% 0.8% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Insurance 11.1% 1.0% 9.7% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Investment funds 27.6% 2.3% 18.9% 3.1% 2.7% 0.6% 0.0%
 
Executive directors 26.1% 7.8% 5.1% 6.4% 5.6% 1.2% 0.0%
Non-executive
directors 10.9% 2.5% 3.1% 2.5% 2.5% 0.4% 0.0%
Industrial firms  14.8% 0.4% 3.7% 5.1% 5.1% 0.0% 0.4%
Families and
individuals 3.1% 0.0% 1.4% 0.6% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Government 0.6% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Real estate 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Widely held 3.9% -- -- -- -- -- --
100.0%
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: This table shows the percentage of sample companies with an aggregated shareholding (panel A) and a largest share stake (panel B) by category of owner and size. 
Source: annual reports